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Asking the right questions in copyright cases:  
Lessons from Aereo and its international brethren* 
Rebecca Giblin** and Jane C. Ginsburg***!
!
Abstract 
Aereo was a US-based service that made unique copies of broadcast 
programs from individual antennae for each requesting user, for 
individual retransmission near-live or at some point in the future. To the 
uninitiated, it makes no sense for a company to design a television 
transmission service that utilises thousands of tiny antennae and 
thousands of copies to deliver signals to users. Wouldn’t it be much more 
efficient to use just one of each? And surely, when it comes to copyright 
liability, wouldn’t more copies result in more infringement, not less? 
However, Aereo’s strategy made a lot of sense when viewed through the 
prism of US copyright law as then interpreted. In this paper we argue that 
US judicial decisions focusing on the “wrong” questions in assessing 
liability for copyright infringement directly encouraged Aereo’s business 
model. We then discuss the Supreme Court’s recent ruling that Aereo’s 
transmission of signals “near-live” does fall within the scope of the 
exclusive right of public performance, and argue that, in correcting the 
Second Circuit’s erroneous inquiries, the Supreme Court raised some 
“wrong” questions of its own. We also examine the legal responses to 
Aereo’s predecessors in Singapore, Japan, Australia, Germany, France 
and the EU to determine whether similarly “wrong” questions have 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
*  Some parts of this paper have been developed or drawn from the authors’ previous work on this topic. 
See Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk About Aereo: Copyright-Avoiding Business 
Models, Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of the “Transmit” Clause, Colum. L. & Economics 
Working Paper No. 480 (2014); Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk About 
Aereo: New Controversies and Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision 
(forthcoming, 38 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts (2015)); Jane C. Ginsburg, Letter from the US: 
Exclusive Rights, Exceptions, and Uncertain Compliance with International Norms (forthcoming, 
Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur (July 2014)); Rebecca Giblin, Stranded in the Technological 
Dark Ages: Implications of the Full Federal Court’s Decision in NRL v Optus 35 European 
Intellectual Property Review 632 (2012).  Many thanks for research assistance to Taylor Jones, 
Columbia Law School class of 2014, and to Nell Ethridge, Columbia Law School class of 2015. 
**  Senior Lecturer, Monash University (Melbourne, Australia). Thanks to Monash University’s Research 
Accelerator Grant, which partly supported the development of this work over 2013-2014.  
*** Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University School of 
Law.  This article benefited from the support of the Philippe P. Dauman Faculty Research Fund. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2539142 
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distorted copyright analysis elsewhere. Finally, we use the insights from 
that international study and Aereo to identify what the “right” questions 
might be. 
 
When Aereo began offering subscribers online access to broadcast TV in 2012, the 
peculiarities of its technical design attracted immediate attention. It set up arrays of 
thousands of thumbnail-sized antennae in its Brooklyn warehouse, and based its system 
around unique copies which were made regardless of whether a subscriber requested to 
“watch” a broadcast (for near-live viewing) or to “record” it (for future consumption). 
When a subscriber launched a request for either service, Aereo’s servers would allocate 
her one of those tiny antennae.1 The servers would then instruct the antenna to tune in to 
the relevant broadcast frequency and create a new directory in which to store the 
recording.2 If 10,000 users all requested the same program be recorded, 10,000 tiny 
antennae would independently tune in, and 10,000 unique copies would be made.3 Since 
Aereo typically assigned users a new antenna for each transaction, many individuals 
would access the same antenna over time.4 However, no two users were ever assigned the 
same antenna simultaneously, and recordings made while an antenna was assigned to a 
particular user were never available to anyone else.5 If a user selected ‘watch’, recordings 
would be automatically discarded after viewing (unless she later chose to keep it); 
‘recorded’ programs would be retained.6 Playback from each unique copy could be 
initiated as it was being made (ie while the program was still airing).7 
To the uninitiated, it makes no sense for a company to design a television transmission 
service that utilises thousands of tiny antennae and thousands of copies to deliver signals 
to users. Wouldn’t it be much more efficient to use just one of each? And surely, when it 
comes to copyright liability, wouldn’t more copies result in more infringement, not less? 
Viewed through the prism of US copyright law, however, Aereo’s strategy made a lot of 
sense. As we demonstrate below, ancillary considerations relating to how the service was 
designed, who made the copy, and who received the transmission could determine 
liability, leaving little room for principled considerations of whether the particular act in 
question ought to be permitted. Aereo’s design was a rational response to this legal 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1  Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
2  Id. at 378. 
3  It appears that three different copies of each program are actually made, of different quality, allowing 
users to choose the one best suited to the internet connection they’re using. Hearst Stations Inc. v. 
Aereo, Inc., No. 13–11649–NMG, 2013 WL 5604284, at *1 (D. Mass Oct. 8, 2013). 
4  Note however that users with ‘static’ subscriptions are generally assigned the same antennas on an 
ongoing basis. See id. at 377-78 
5  Id.  at 378. 
6  Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
7  Id. at 377. 
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framework: an attempt to exploit the contours of the existing law to enable the service to 
deliver copyrighted content online without infringing any of the owners’ exclusive rights. 
This article considers the challenges the Aereo controversy posed and argues that US 
judicial interpretations that have focused on the “wrong” questions in analysing liability 
for copyright infringement encouraged Aereo’s business model. We then discuss the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision that Aereo’s transmission of signals “near-live” does 
fall within the scope of the right of public performance, and argue that, in correcting the 
Second Circuit’s erroneous inquiries, the Supreme Court raised some “wrong” questions 
of its own. Later, we examine the legal responses to Aereo’s international predecessors in 
Singapore, Japan, Australia, Germany, France and the EU to determine whether similarly 
“wrong” questions have distorted copyright analysis elsewhere. Finally, we use the 
insights from that international study and Aereo to identify what the “right” questions 
might be.    
 
Part 1: The pre-Aereo law (and its focus on the “wrong” questions) 
Aereo’s service implicates two of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights – of 
reproduction and of public performance.8 This section builds the case that, before Aereo, 
judicial interpretations of the scope of each of those rights directed courts to look at the 
“wrong” questions in determining liability.  We define “wrong” questions as those which 
render the law vulnerable to “avoision” - conduct, combining aspects of law “evasion” 
and “avoidance”, which exploits “the differences between a law’s goals and its self-
defined limits”.9 As we will see, those questions tend to relate to ancillary considerations 
such as how a service is designed. The “right” questions, by contrast, allow courts to 
engage in principled consideration of whether a particular use should come within or fall 
outside the copyright owner’s exclusive rights, regardless of the technical means 
employed.  
At the time of writing, the only part of the case against Aereo to have proceeded to 
judgment concerns issuance of a preliminary injunction against providing access to 
streams of “near-live” television. Thus, the only “wrong” questions to have been asked so 
far in that litigation concern the scope of the right of public performance. However, it is 
nonetheless useful to identify the “wrong” questions in the context of the reproduction 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
8  See 17 USC § 106(1), (4). The case against Aereo more broadly claims that Aereo has engaged in 
direct and contributory infringement of the public performance and reproduction rights. Am. Broad. 
Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). However, the reproduction right 
and contributory infringement claims have not yet proceeded to judgment. 
9  Tim Wu, “When Code Isn’t Law” 89 Virginia Law Review 679, 692 (2003). See also Leo Katz, Ill-
Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud and Kindred Puzzles of the Law (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1996).  See also Susy Frankel, “The International Copyright Problem and Durable 
Solutions,” 15 Vanderbilt J. Ent. And Tech. L.(forthcoming 2015). 
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right because their existence explains Aereo’s design. They also reveal why, in a case 
involving so many copies, the plaintiff broadcasters chose to focus their attack on the 
right of public performance. 
 
The right to reproduce the work in copies 
Copies of broadcasts were made when users instructed Aereo’s system that they wished 
to “watch” or “record” a show. In determining whether these copies infringed the 
broadcasters’ reproduction rights, the key preliminary question has been, “who made 
them?”  
The answer to that question determines who may face direct liability for infringement of 
the reproduction right – and whether liability exists at all. Current US law tends to apply 
less favorably to commercial service providers who do an act on a user’s behalf than to 
the user herself.10 Thus, for example, a user might be entitled to make free copies of 
material for non profit educational uses under the fair use exception, but a for-profit copy 
shop making exactly the same copies on the user’s behalf would be liable for 
infringement.11  
If the court finds that the user committed the allegedly infringing act, the court will next 
address the affirmative defense that the fair use doctrine entitles the user to make the 
copies (or otherwise engage in prima facie infringing conduct). If the user’s act is deemed 
a fair use, then courts do not consider whether the service provider’s contribution to the 
commission of the act should be permitted for free.  Logically, there can be no liability 
for enabling the commission of a lawful act. Thus, if Aereo’s users “made” the copies, 
the broadcasters would have to persuade a court to distinguish that conduct from the 
consumer uses of Sony’s Betamax VCR to timeshift free broadcast television 
programming, uses the Supreme Court in 1984 held were fair.12 By contrast, if Aereo 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
10  Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on 
the Ebb? 17 (Columbia Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 08158, 2008); WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 7:3 (2014). 
11  See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). However, courts 
have been more willing to find that uses on behalf of third parties are fair where they are done for 
non-profit purposes. See e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker. 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 
2012) (reversed on other grounds) (in which a Georgia district court held that the creation of 
electronic coursepacks by a nonprofit educational institution for nonprofit educational purposes was 
fair use); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (in which it was held 
that photocopying by the library of the National Institutes of Health of scholarly articles on behalf of 
members was fair use). 
12  See Brief for Respondents at 36-37, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, (Mar. 26, 
2014), 2014 WL 1245459, at *36-37; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984).  See infra TAN xx for discussion of whether Sony remains persuasive in the digital 
environment. 
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“made” the copies, the arguable fair use entitlement of Aereo’s customers to make the 
copies would be irrelevant; as the for-profit party committing the unauthorized act of 
reproduction, Aereo would clearly be an infringer.  
The answer to “who makes?” also has important follow-on consequences. A person who 
does not herself engage in the legally relevant act, but encourages or contributes to 
someone else’s infringement, may nonetheless incur secondary liability for that act. The 
principles governing the accrual of liability in such cases consider the nature and extent 
of the provider’s contribution, and have been carefully calibrated in an attempt to 
preserve technologies with substantial non-infringing uses from secondary liability. If the 
subscriber’s deliberate act is instead attributed to the technology provider, that provider 
may be liable under the broader principles governing direct infringement, without the 
safety valves that have accompanied secondary infringement analysis. 
For each of these reasons Aereo had strong legal incentives to design its service in a way 
that prompted the conclusion that the user, rather than the service, made the copies. The 
precedent set by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Cartoon Networks v CSC 
Holdings strongly suggested that Aereo could do so. The technology there at issue was 
Cablevision’s “Remote Storage DVR System” (RS-DVR), which worked the same way 
as a regular DVR, except that, instead of recording the programming onto the hard disk 
of a device in the consumer’s home, the service would record the content onto a 
customer’s allotted storage space on one of Cablevision’s central servers, and stream the 
programming back on demand.13 The Second Circuit held that, “[i]n determining who 
actually ‘makes’ a copy, a significant difference exists between making a request to a 
human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, 
and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and 
engages in no volitional conduct.”14 Though noting that Cablevision’s discretion over the 
programming that it was making available for recording made its conduct “more 
proximate” to the creation of the copies than merely operating an ISP, the court 
concluded that Cablevision’s involvement was not enough to justify a finding that 
Cablevision was itself a “maker” of the copies.15  
This reference to “volition” can be traced to the 1995 district court decision in Religious 
Technology Center v Netcom.16 There, the court declined to hold an ISP or bulletin board 
provider directly liable for its facilities’ automatic reproduction of a copyrighted work 
that one of its users had posted. The court reasoned that, despite copyright infringement’s 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
13  Detailed descriptions of the Cablevision RS-DVR are set out at Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Cartoon Network v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2008). 
14  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2008). 
15  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2008). 
16  Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal 1995). 
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strict liability standard, “there should still be some element of volition or causation which 
is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”17 
The Fourth Circuit subsequently endorsed that distinction in a case involving an internet 
service provider whose subscribers uploaded infringing photographs to its servers.18 In 
Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit significantly expanded the ambit of the volition 
criterion from passive communication of third party content to proposing content to copy 
at the user’s behest. 
It should now be clear why Aereo designed its system to rely on copies. Under the 
Cartoon Network template, those copies would be made by the service’s subscribers. If 
so, Aereo believed there was a strong case for those copies being unremunerable fair uses 
in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 holding that consumer uses of Sony’s 
Betamax VCR to timeshift free broadcast television programming are lawful.19 If that 
were so, none of those copies would give rise to direct liability (and there would be no 
infringement for which Aereo might potentially be held secondarily liable). 
 
Why “who makes?” is the wrong question 
As this analysis demonstrates, a great deal hangs on the answer to the question, “who 
makes?” In the case of Aereo, if the user made the copies then there is potentially no 
copyright liability at all (with no consideration given to whether the service provider’s 
contribution to the commission of the act should be permitted for free). If it is the service 
provider, all of the copies would likely be infringing (with little room to consider whether 
the subscriber’s ultimate use ought to be permitted). Such black-and-white distinctions 
may have been suitable and appropriate in the pre-digital world, where technologies 
required much more human input, making it easier to determine each party’s contribution 
to the act. Today however, technology provides us with ever-more sophisticated 
assistance, making it much more difficult to separate the contributions of the service 
provider and the user. For example, we use backup software that automatically scans our 
hard drives for new content, and uploads copies to the cloud for safekeeping.20 We use 
DVRs that helpfully record shows for us (without our asking) based on programs we’ve 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
17  Id. at 1370. 
18  CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004)). 
19  See Brief for Respondents at 36-37, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, (Mar. 26, 
2014), 2014 WL 1245459, at *36-37; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). However, see Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New 
Controversies and Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision (forthcoming, 38 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts (2015)) at 37-38 of pre-publication copy (arguing that the fair 
use case is by no means clear cut).  See also infra TAN xx for analysis of differences between the 
Betamax, and “timeshifting” in the current digital environment. 
20  See e.g. the Mozy backup software; http://mozy.com/product/features/online-backup. 
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previously enjoyed.21  As technology evolves still further, judicial determination of who 
actually engages in the legally relevant act will require the making of increasingly fine-
grained and potentially unhelpful distinctions Our discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
response to Aereo will identify examples of these sorts of distinctions. We will also see 
that such distinctions can lead to avoision: making the legal outcome depend on “who 
does the act?” simply incentivises technology providers to design their services so that 
the answer is “the user”. Yet the act itself may ultimately result in the same market harm 
whether the answer is “the user” or “the service provider.”  Thus, when so much hangs on 
the answer to the ‘who does?” question, and when the distinctions relied upon to support 
one conclusion or the other are so arbitrary, it should be clear that “who does?” is the 
wrong question.  
 
Transmissions 
In the case of liability for public performance, it is even more starkly apparent which 
questions are the “wrong” ones. The Copyright Act defines “perform” as “to recite, 
render, play, dance, or act [the work], either directly or by means of any device or 
process, or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images 
in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”22 Courts have ruled that 
a “performance” must be “simultaneously perceptible;” this condition puts downloads 
(viewed after their transmission) outside the scope of the right.23 The definition of “to 
perform publicly” has two limbs. To perform or display a work “publicly” means— 
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered; or 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to 
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times.24 
The act defines to “transmit” a performance or display of the work as meaning “to 
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
21  See “TiVo Suggestions”; http://support.tivo.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/205. 
22  17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, current through P.L. 113-66). 
23  U.S. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors, Publishers, 627 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2010).  
24  17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010). 
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the place from which they are sent.” “Devices” and “processes” expressly include those 
developed after the law came into effect.25 
The discrete definitions of public performance aim at two very different activities. The 
first seeks to capture performances which are in public. The second targets performances 
transmitted to a place we would think of as “private” (for example, viewers’ homes), but 
which nonetheless target “members of the public” and are therefore to the public. In the 
case of performances transmitted to the public for receipt in private places, caselaw and 
secondary authority establish that a “substantial number of persons” need not in fact have 
received the transmission; rather it suffices that the performance of the work be offered to 
“members of the public.”26  
For identifying the “wrong” questions asked in ascertaining infringement of the public 
performance right, the starting point once again is Cartoon Network v. Cablevision. 
While the Cablevision system closely resembled a traditional home recording service 
(which does not implicate the public performance right), its streaming of content on 
demand to users made it also resemble video-on-demand (which does). Was the cable 
company engaged in infringing public performances when it streamed the recordings 
back to its subscribers?  
To reach its conclusion, the Second Circuit had to identify the relevant performance. By 
stating that “[t]o perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public”, the statute defines the act 
of transmitting a performance as one type of performing, even though the terms “to 
perform” and “to transmit” are separately defined as well. Was the relevant performance 
the performance created by the act of the transmission (as argued by Cablevision) or the 
performance of the underlying work (as favored by the broadcasters)? 
The Second Circuit ultimately held that, in the context of transmitting a performance to 
the public, Congress was referring “to the performance created by the act of 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
25  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, 94th Cong. 2d sess. at 64 (1976)): “The definition of ‘transmit’ . . . 
is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless 
communications media, including but by no means limited to radio and television broadcasting as we 
know them. Each and every method by which the images or sounds comprising a performance or 
display are picked up and conveyed is a ‘transmission,’ and if the transmission reaches the public in 
[any] form, the case comes within the scope of clauses (4) or (5) of section 106.”; H.R. Rep. No. 90-
83, 90th Cong., 1st sess. at 29 (1967): the legislation anticipates “the case of sounds or images stored in 
an information system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative of individual 
members of the public.”. 
26  Some authorities have also pointed out the commercial character of transmissions held to have been 
made to “members of the public,” see, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).  In Cablevision and in dissent in Aereo, Judge Chin cited the 
commercial character of the relationship to buttress his determination that the transmissions were to 
“paying strangers,” and thus “to the public.”  See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision 
Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500, 
505 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting).  See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 1, text at notes 159-63.  
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transmission.”27 Having accepted that the transmission was the relevant performance, the 
Second Circuit then considered which members of the public were capable of receiving 
that performance. It held that, since each transmission was made to a specific subscriber 
from her own copy, the audience of each transmission was just a single individual, and 
therefore the relevant performances could not possibly be “to the public”.28    
 
Why whether the transmission originates from a unique copy and goes to a single 
individual is the “wrong” question  
In the Second Circuit’s analysis, the key question was whether the transmission 
originated from a unique copy and went to a specific individual. The Second Circuit’s 
holdings suggest that, regardless of the nature of the relationship between the recipient 
and the content, there can be no public performance where the service structures the 
transmission so that it can be received by only one person. 
By basing the standard on the number of possible recipients of each transmission, and by 
acknowledging, by contrast, that a service whose transmissions emanated from a single 
centralized copy would be liable, the court focused on technological design rather than on 
principled considerations of whether the particular use ought to be permitted. It 
encouraged “avoision” by telling providers that, by making technologically inefficient 
decisions, they can avoid the liability that would accrue to a more efficient technology 
facilitating precisely the same end result. Asking how many people can receive a given 
transmission thus is a “wrong” question because it focuses on extraneous considerations 
without capturing the essence of the distinction between “public” and “non public” 
performances. Perhaps the number of persons capable of receiving a transmission from a 
single source copy was a relevant consideration back in 1984, when a court referred to 
successive viewers of a single copy to explain that a video store was engaging in “public” 
performances when it played a single copy of a film multiple times to different small 
groups of members of the public.29 However, in an environment in which it is possible 
cheaply to assign each subscriber her “own” copy, thus ensuring that the same copy does 
not serve successive viewers, to base the analysis of the “public” character of a 
transmission on the number of people permitted to access transmissions from a given 
source copy simply invites technological manipulations. 
In fairness to the Second Circuit, its focus on the wrong questions might have derived 
from the matter’s procedural history. The parties reached a deal to leave certain issues off 
the table in the litigation between them; the plaintiff broadcasters did not allege 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
27  Id. at 136. 
28  Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008). 
29  Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir.1984). 
10"
"
Cablevision’s liability for secondary infringement, and in exchange, Cablevision waived 
any defenses based on its customers’ possible fair use.30 Had the case been fully argued, 
the Court might have decided the case on other aspects of the copyright framework. As it 
was however, its resolution of the case, with its focus on the “wrong” questions, provided 
fertile ground for avoision. 
 
Part 2: Asking the wrong questions of Aereo 
As explained above, the only aspects of the Aereo controversy so far to have been 
adjudicated concern whether Aereo should be enjoined from providing access to 
broadcast television (during the initial broadcast) on the grounds that its service violates 
the right of public performance. Here, we examine how the lower courts and ultimately 
the Supreme Court confronted Aereo’s challenge to the reach of the public performance 
right. 
The lower court decisions 
Applying Cartoon Network v. Cablevision, the district court and a divided Second Circuit 
each concluded that Aereo had not “publicly performed” the television programs.31 The 
appeals court majority reiterated its view that “the relevant inquiry under the Transmit 
Clause is the potential audience of a particular transmission, not the potential audience 
for the underlying work or the particular performance of that work being transmitted.”32 
It also held that “two essential facts” led to the holding that Cablevision’s transmissions 
were not public performances: Cablevision’s RS-DVR allowed each subscriber to create 
unique copies of each program, and the subscriber’s unique copy was the source of the 
transmission back to the subscriber.33 These features meant that “the potential audience 
of every RS-DVR transmission was only a single Cablevision subscriber, namely the 
subscriber who created the copy;” thus restricted, the transmission was not “to the 
public”.34 Aereo’s system emulated those two features.35 
The dissenting judge charged that Aereo’s technical architecture was “a sham”: 
The system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there is no 
technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual antennas rather 
than one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
30  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124. 
31  874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). 
32  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 691 (2d Cir. 2013). 
33  Id. at 689. 
34  Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted). 
35  Id. at 690. 
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over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take 
advantage of a perceived loophole in the law. 36 
The majority retorted that many other technology providers, particularly cloud computing 
services, had also designed their systems around Cablevision’s holdings. “Perhaps the 
application of the Transmit Clause should focus less on the technical details of a 
particular system and more on its functionality, but this Court’s decisions . . . held that 
technical architecture matters.”37 Acknowledging that it is more difficult to distinguish 
between public and private transmissions than when Congress enacted the transmit clause 
in 1976, the majority ultimately concluded that the language of the Act, as previously 
interpreted in Cablevision, dictated the conclusion that Aereo’s transmissions were not 
public performances.38 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision  
In determining whether Aereo was liable for infringing public performance, the Supreme 
Court on ultimate appeal asked two questions: first, did Aereo perform at all? Second, if 
it did, were those performances “to the public?” 
Did Aereo perform? 
The Second Circuit in Cartoon Network and Aereo never determined who engaged in the 
relevant performance, because its findings that the unique copy architecture prevented 
any of those transmissions from being “to the public” made it unnecessary to do so. 
However, the Supreme Court did confront this issue.  
The six justice majority (Breyer, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and 
Kagan) held that Aereo had indeed performed the relevant act. Though noting the Act 
does not delineate between entities which themselves “perform” and those which merely 
supply equipment enabling others to do so, the majority found that, “read in light of its 
purpose, the Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s 
performs.”39 In analysis that did not mention the concept of volition at all, the majority 
reasoned: 
Aereo's activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that 
Congress amended the Act to reach… Aereo sells a service that allows 
subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, almost 
as they are being broadcast. In providing this service, Aereo uses its own 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
36  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., dissenting). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 695. 
39  Id. at 2504. 
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equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes. By 
means of its technology (antennas, transcoders, and servers), Aereo's system 
“receive[s] programs that have been released to the public and carr[ies] them by 
private channels to additional viewers.”40 
This holding is a narrow one. It instructs that a technology provider may itself perform 
when it is sufficiently analogous to a CATV operator, but provides little guidance about 
whether and when, outside those circumstances, a technology provider will be 
sufficiently involved in the infringement to justify the imposition of direct liability.  
The three justice dissent (Scalia, joined by Thomas and Alito) objected that Aereo lacked 
sufficient volition to be the one “performing” the programming.41 Accordingly, these 
justices found it unnecessary to go on to consider whether the performance was “to the 
public”. Since the only claim being litigated was that Aereo itself had publicly 
performed, if Aereo did not “perform,” there could be no liability. 
 
Were Aereo’s performances “to the public”? 
The majority’s analysis proceeded on the basis that the relevant act is the performance of 
the underlying work (effectively overturning the Second Circuit’s statutory interpretation 
identifying the relevant performance as the transmission to the recipient).42 It then held 
that those performances were “to the public” notwithstanding each transmission’s origin 
in a separate subscriber-assigned copy. In reaching that finding, the court revisited the 
meaning of “the public”. It noted that, although the Act does not define this term, it does 
specify that an entity performs publicly when it performs at “any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered.”43 After repeatedly emphasizing the importance of 
transmissions being made to a “large” group of people in order to be “to the public”, the 
court concluded that “an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit to a 
substantial number of people outside of a family and its social circle.”44 Thus, the Court 
used the text of the first limb of the statutory definition of “to perform publicly” 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
40  Id. at 2506. 
41   Id. at 2514. 
42  Although the majority states it assumes, arguendo, that Aereo’s argument that the performance is that 
which arises from the transmission is correct, its application of the law makes sense only if the 
relevant performance is the performance of the underlying work. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2508 (2014).  Indeed, the court later made that assumption clear:  “So whether 
Aereo transmits from the same or separate copies, it performs the same work; it shows the same 
images and makes audible the same sounds. Therefore, when Aereo streams the same television 
program to multiple subscribers, it ‘transmit[s] . . . a performance’ to all of them.”  134 S.Ct. at 2509.   
43  Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509-10 (2014) 
44  Id. at 2510-11. 
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(performance in public) to help it define the meaning of “the public” in the second 
(transmission to the public). The Court then further narrowed the meaning of “the public” 
by stating that “those who act as owners or possessors of the relevant product” do not 
constitute “the public”,45 and by noting, without further explanation, that “the doctrine of 
‘fair use’ can help to prevent inappropriate or inequitable applications of the [Transmit] 
Clause.”46   
How the Supreme Court created new “wrong” questions of its own 
The Supreme Court welcomely recognised that, by concentrating on the individual 
transmissions to subscribers, the Second Circuit had asked the “wrong” question in 
considering whether Aereo’s facts gave rise to any infringing public performance. 
However, in redefining what it means to perform “to the public”, it raised some “wrong” 
questions of its own.  
First, by inquiring whether Aereo “performed,” the Court continued to give the question 
“who does the act?” dispositive significance.  Moreover, the Court’s way of answering 
that question is likely to encourage avoision.  As we have seen, when “who does the act?” 
is the predicate question, a court may never assess applicability of exceptions or of 
principles of secondary liability.  Failure to confront the economic concerns that underlie 
both fair use and contributory infringement may not be problematic where “who does the 
act?” is readily apparent. But as we noted above, technological advances have made it 
increasingly difficult to ascertain to whom to attribute the copyright-triggering act, 
leading to the use of increasingly arbitrary and granular distinctions.  
The majority’s analysis in Aereo exemplifies this difficulty. The factors which inclined 
the court to find that Aereo itself transmitted the content (rather than simply enabling its 
users to do so) focused on Aereo’s similarities to 1970s-era cable TV providers. Like 
those community antenna companies, Aereo’s service allowed subscribers to watch near-
live television broadcasts. It used its own equipment, and that the equipment was housed 
in a centralized warehouse rather than in users’ homes. This combination of 
circumstances led the majority to conclude that Aereo committed the legally relevant 
acts.47  
The Supreme Court carefully confined its decision to the facts, and gave no guidance as 
to when, outside these factors, a provider may face direct rather than secondary liability. 
The Court’s silence portends that future judicial determinations of technology providers’ 
commission of the legally relevant acts will depend too heavily on the relationship of the 
design of technologies to business models. Reference to analogous technologies 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
45  Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510 
46  Id. at 2511 
47  See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014). 
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demonstrates the arbitrariness of these considerations. For example, Cablevision’s RS-
DVR also utilizes the service provider’s own equipment, housed in a centralized 
warehouse, but it allows programs to be streamed back from recordings only after the 
broadcast is complete. What, if any, difference does/should delaying the commencement 
of playback till after completion of the initial broadcast make?  (The Court emphatically 
declined to address whether RS-DVR services “publicly perform” the timeshifted works.)  
The “Hopper with Sling”, a DVR + slingbox provided by a major satellite company in 
the US, allows the transmission of near-live TV broadcasts via equipment owned by the 
satellite company, but located in the user’s home instead of in a centralized warehouse. 
What, if any, difference does/should locating the recording and transmission equipment 
in the subscriber’s home rather than in the service’s facilities make? 
Our analysis in earlier work demonstrates that, under the Supreme Court’s reasoning, 
such details of location, ownership and technological design may in fact make the 
difference between legality and infringement – even if the ultimate act remains the 
same.48 We also suggested that making these differences outcome-determinative was 
undesirable.  Courts’ emphasis on these details creates obvious new incentives for 
avoision: a service provider, seeking to accomplish an act which would be infringing if 
done by the service, but permitted if done by the user, will rationally design its 
technology to assign “actor” attribution to the user. Thus the law (rather than the nature 
of the services the technologies deliver) may dictate the design of future technologies. 
For example: online access to remote equipment is cheap and efficient, and can result in 
improved access for individuals who cannot afford to purchase it outright. But the 
Supreme Court may have incentivised future providers to design products that are owned 
by consumers and based in their homes – even though considerations of location and 
ownership say nothing about the desirability or harm of the underlying use.  
The Supreme Court also asked the “wrong” questions in determining when a performance 
is “to the public”. One of the “wrong” questions that the Second Circuit in Cartoon 
Network had asked was whether the transmission originates from a unique copy and goes 
to a specific individual. The Second Circuit’s holding suggested that there can be no 
public performance where the service structures the transmission so that it can be 
received by only one person, regardless of the nature of the relationship between that 
person and the content. The Supreme Court correctly ruled that this was not the right 
question. However, its own definition of what it means to perform “to the public” was not 
entirely successful either.   
As noted above, the majority repeatedly emphasized that the transmission be made to a 
“large” group of people in order to be “to the public.”  Moreover, it declared that “an 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
48  Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New Controversies and 
Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision (forthcoming, 38 Columbia Journal of Law 
& the Arts (2015)); at 18-22; 24-28 of pre-publication copy.   
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entity does not transmit to the public if it does not transmit to a substantial number of 
people outside of a family and its social circle.”49 It seems likely that the majority 
imported that size requirement into the latter analysis to avoid problems of over-
inclusivity arising from its ruling that the relevant act was the performance of the 
underlying work (rather than the individual transmission). But importing a size 
requirement into the transmit clause misses the essence of the statutory distinction 
between public performances (encompassed within the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights) and non-public performances (to which exclusive rights do not extend): size is a 
proxy for economic significance; in most cases (at least under prior technologies) a 
transmission offered to a small group of persons, or to members of a family and its social 
acquaintance, would not have significantly intruded on the copyright owner’s markets for 
publicly communicating performances of the work.  But size is not a value of its own, 
and the omission of a size of audience criterion from the text of the transmit clause 
(unlike the performance “in public” clause) should be taken seriously.  What matters is 
whether the offeree of the transmission is a “member of the public,” not how many 
members of the public are “capable of receiving” the transmission.  The omission of a 
size threshold from the transit clause enables the public performance right to adapt to 
changing market conditions as the means and granularity of transmissions evolve. 
 Instead, the court’s definition of “the public” creates a gap in the scope of the public 
performance right that invites new business models for delivery of performances of 
works.  A novel suggestion proposed by the Wall Street Journal for reducing cable bills 
in the wake of Aereo – sharing a single cable subscription between two households by 
utilizing a Slingbox – proves the point. One household would have legitimate access to 
the cable content via a paid subscription, and would “sling” the content to the other, 
giving access to the content without ever making any copies. The second household could 
watch whatever it liked unless the first household was watching too; in that case, it would 
be limited to the same programming– and have no recourse if the person operating the 
remote control in the subscribing household decided to change the channel halfway 
through Homeland’s season finale.  The WSJ writer argued this arrangement was legal 
since “this stream goes from one cable connection to just one outside device.”50   
But transmissions even to a small audience can interfere significantly with licensed 
markets. Think about how the arrangement proposed by the WSJ might spread. The 
“sharing economy” is all the rage at the moment, connecting those who have unused 
resources with those who seek them. AirBnB, for example, creates a market for 
households to rent out their spare rooms. Uber joins those who need a ride with those 
who have a car. Households with cable subscriptions might readily reach agreement with 
friends or relatives to share those, too.  And the cable-equipped households could add 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
49  Id. at 2510-11. 
50  http://online.wsj.com/articles/getting-rid-of-cable-tv-the-smartest-ways-to-cut-the-cord-1405472757 
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more functionality by attaching the slingbox to a secondary set-top box, allowing both 
households to have full access to the subscribing household’s content without limiting 
anyone’s viewing choices.51 Since they’re non rivalrous in consumption, TV signals 
could be the ultimate contribution to the “sharing economy”. 
We caution, however, that Aereo should not spawn “sharing economy” brokerage 
services, akin to Air BnB or Uber.  A household that offers unused cable service to a 
friend limits not only the transmission but also the offer to one other person.  By contrast, 
an “Uber for cable TV” service offers the surplus cable service to the public in general, 
even though only one household will in fact receive the shared cable transmissions.  
Properly understood, Aereo’s definition of “the public” refers to the public to whom the 
transmission is proposed.  If the brokerage service is putting the sharing household 
together with the first-comer who replies to an offer made to members of the public at 
large (or, for that matter, to members of a more narrowly defined “public,” such as fans 
of Homeland), the transmissions are “to the public.”52 Of course, the Aereo court did not 
confront such scenarios, but the posited, unbrokered, arrangement indeed appears to be 
consistent with the court’s statements, to the extent they exclude transmissions that the 
person engaging in the performance offers to only a small group or to a single individual.  
Applying Aereo, the performances would be engaged in by the householder providing 
and hosting the equipment and signal.  But the performances would not be “to the public” 
under the majority’s reasoning, because they would not have been offered to a “large or 
substantial” number of people, even though the cumulative impact on rightholders were 
many people to adopt this practice could be severe.   Aereo’s concept of “the public,” as 
currently articulated, seems insufficiently nuanced to confront situations involving 
individual performances to small audiences that cumulatively interfere with markets for 
licensed alternatives. Moreover, once an avenue of exploitation opens, many will surely 
follow it; the more widespread the activity, the more difficult it may later become to 
interpret the copyright act to restrict the practice.  Thus, the court’s reasoning may open 
the door to some of the same kind of “avoision” or technological exploitation that it was 
intended to redress. 
 
Part 3: Do other jurisdictions focus on the “wrong” questions too? Aereo-style 
business models abroad  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
51  http://support.slingbox.com/KB/KB-2000571 ‘Using Sling’. 
52  In this scenario, the “maker” of the transmissions would be the householder , not the broker through 
whom the householder offers to share the subscription with a member of the public.  But the broker 
would likely be secondarily liable for contributing to or inducing infringement.  Other scenarios might 
involve intermediaries whose participation might be deemed too attenuated to warrant secondary 
liability, such as the operator of a “Craigslist” type website that featured a general “sharing economy”  
category of listings, not broken down into categories sufficiently specific to suggest knowledge of 
what is being “shared.”    
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In our analysis above, we argue that the US law (both before and after Aereo) asks 
several “wrong questions” in determining liability. Aereo is not the first business to have 
sought to facilitate copyright-free communications by assigning individual copies of 
broadcast or cable-transmitted content to requesting subscribers and then retransmitting 
the content exclusively to that subscriber from “her” copy. It has a number of 
entrepreneurial predecessors that have been tested in the courts of other jurisdictions. In 
this section we canvas that history to see both whether the wrong questions are being 
asked elsewhere too, and if we can glean some lessons for determining what the right 
questions might be.   
 
Singapore 
The key authorities in Singapore stem from litigation against RecordTV’s “iDVR” 
service. The iDVR service did not initially make multiple unique copies when multiple 
subscribers requested the same program to be recorded, but it began migrating to a 
multiple copy architecture during the course of the Cartoon Network litigation, and had 
begun using this method exclusively within a month or two of the Second Circuit’s 
decision.53 In other essential respects the Singaporean service closely resembled 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR.54 In response, the nation’s largest broadcaster claimed that 
RecordTV’s service infringed its exclusive rights relating to copying and electronic 
communication.  
 
Under Singaporean law, copyright owners have the exclusive right to “communicate to 
the public”, with “communicate” defined to mean: 
 
to transmit by electronic means (whether over a path, or a combination of paths, 
provided by a material substance or by wireless means or otherwise) a work or 
other subject-matter, whether or not it is sent in response to a request, and 
includes - 
             … 
(c) the making available of a work or other subject-matter (on a network 
or otherwise) in such a way that the work or subject-matter may be 
accessed by any person from a place and at a time chosen by him.55 
 
The Act further provides that “a communication other than a broadcast is taken to have 
been made by the person responsible for determining the content of the communication at 
the time the communication is made.”56 
 
Singaporean law also provides that there is no infringement of the copyright in a TV or 
cable broadcast (or any underlying work) where a user makes copies for her “private and 
domestic use.”57 These copies were not unremunerated: at the time the case was brought, 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
53  RecordTV v MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, 836. 
54  RecordTV Pte Ltd v MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 152, 157-158; RecordTV v 
MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, at 833-836. 
55  Copyright Act 1987 (Singapore), s 7. 
56  Copyright Act 1987 (Singapore), s 16(6). 
57  Copyright Act 1987 (Singapore), s 114. 
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Singaporean households were obliged to pay an annual licence fee in exchange for 
receiving TV signals. The Court of Appeal read the exception as allowing those with 
valid licences to make copies of those programs as well.58 
 
The wording of the private copying exception made it crucial to determine who made the 
copies: if the service, then the service would infringe, but if the user, the exception would 
apply. In analysis heavily influenced by the Second Circuit’s holdings regarding 
“volition”, the Court of Appeal held that the copies were made by the subscribers, not the 
service, and therefore there was no infringement.59  
 
There was no liability under the electronic communication right either, for two reasons. 
First, the users who had requested the recording be made and then communicated to them 
did not constitute “the public” within the meaning of the Act.60 Though “the public” is 
not defined, the Court of Appeal found it highly relevant that the only recipient of each 
recording would be the user or users who had requested it to be made, and saw “no 
reason why the aggregate of the private and individual communications made to each of 
the … Registered Users should transform the nature of such communications into 
“public” communications.”61 Second, even if the subscribers were “the public,” there 
would nonetheless be no liability on these facts because the communication to the 
subscribers was not “made” by RecordTV. As noted above, under Singaporean law 
communications are taken to have been made by the person responsible for determining 
the content of the communication at the time the communication is made.62 The Court of 
Appeal distinguished these facts from situations involving video-on-demand providers 
who share a library of pre-selected works with users at large.63 Instead, it reasoned that, 
because the only works that were “communicated” to an individual user were those he or 
she had previously selected for recording, it was that subscriber who was responsible for 
determining the content of the communication at the relevant time, and thus the maker of 
the communication.64  
 
Are these the right questions? 
 
As this summary demonstrates, even more hangs on the answer to “who makes?” under 
Singaporean law than in the US. Under US law, whether the user has the right to make 
copies of broadcast TV signals depends on whether the use is “fair”; that requires 
consideration of factors such as the effect of the use upon the potential market for the 
work.65 Under Singaporean law however, private copies of TV or cable broadcasts can be 
made regardless of such considerations. Thus, the “winner takes all” – if the maker of the 
copies is the user, the copying is permitted (with no room to consider whether that 
outcome is appropriate given the extent of the service provider’s contribution); if the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
58  RecordTV v MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, 835. 
59  RecordTV v MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, at  838-842. 
60  RecordTV v MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, at 842-845. 
61  RecordTV v MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, at  843. 
62  Copyright Act 1987 (Singapore), s 16(6). 
63  RecordTV v MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, at  846. 
64  RecordTV v MediaCorp TV Singapore [2011] 1 SLR 830, at  846-847. 
65  See 17 USC § 107.  
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maker is the service provider, the use is infringing (regardless of whether it is appropriate 
for the individual to be permitted to engage in the use). The consequences of that lack of 
nuance become apparent in examining RecordTV’s current offerings. While the appeals 
court’s finding that the users made the copies was apparently influenced by the licence 
fees paid by Singaporeans for that content, TV licences were abolished a month after the 
decision.66  RecordTV nonetheless continues to provide its service, and now offers 
subscribers the opportunity to record single shows, entire series or even their favourite 
channels nonstop, 24/7.67 This service seems to provide a very good substitute for 
remunerated on-demand access.  
 
Applying the right of public performance, the Court of Appeal suggested that the 
communications could not be “to the public” because they are made and transmitted to 
the same person. In any event, it held that they could not be public because each 
recording was directed only to a single individual. As in Cartoon Network, this reasoning 
incentivises providers to design their technologies to use individualised transmissions, 
rather than squarely confronting the essence of “public” versus “non public” 
communications, and renders the law highly vulnerable to avoision. On both counts, the 
focus was on the “wrong” questions. 
 
 
Australia 
Making private copies of television programs was unlawful in Australia until 2006, when 
a statutory exception finally permitted the making of recordings “solely for private and 
domestic use by watching or listening to the material broadcast at a time more convenient 
than the time when the broadcast is made”.68 As in Singapore, there is no requirement 
that those uses be “fair”. In 2011, telecommunications provider Optus introduced a 
remote DVR service called “TV Now”.69 TV Now worked just like Cablevision’s RS-
DVR and Record TV’s iDVR: subscribers could request television programs to be 
recorded by making selections from the online program guide, and subsequently play 
them back via their web browser or on a mobile device.70 Individual copies were made 
for, and played back exclusively to, each requesting user.  Unique recordings for each 
requesting user were stored remotely on Optus’s servers, and then streamed to 
subscribers’ devices on request, sometimes as they were still airing.71 The service was 
explicitly aimed as users who wished to timeshift broadcasts; the service prevented 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
66  See eg Media Exchange, ‘Radio and Television licence abolished’ 
http://www.mda.gov.sg/Documents/Newsletter/Issue06/Pages/01.aspx.html.  
67  RecordTV.com (content viewable only from a Singaporean IP address). Screenshot of RecordTV’s 
website offering this feature on file with authors.  
68  See Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth) (Australia), Schedule 6, Part 1. For a fuller discussion of 
the definition see Rebecca Giblin, 'Optus v NRL: A Seismic Shift for Time Shifting in Australia' 
(2012) 35 European Intellectual Property Review 357, at n19. 
69  Singtel Optus v National Rugby League Investments (No 2) [2012] FCA 34, at [2]-[3]. 
70  Singtel Optus v National Rugby League Investments (No 2) [2012] FCA 34, at [2]. 
71  Id  at [17]. 
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librarying by automatically deleting recordings from the remote storage after 30 days, 
and no copies were made on subscribers’ machines.72   
 
Sporting organisations and the licensee of their mobile streaming rights quickly sued. 
Once again, the relevant rights concerned the making of copies and electronic 
communications. To “communicate” means to make copyrighted protected subject matter 
available online, or to transmit it electronically.73  As in Singaporean law, 
communications (other than broadcasts) are taken to have been made “by the person 
responsible for determining the content of the communication.”74 
 
The trial judge found no infringement of the communication right. His starting point was 
the same as under Singaporean law: the finding that the relevant communications were 
made by users, not by Optus, since the users were the ones responsible for determining 
the content of the communication.75 (Optus did not “communicate” because “it did 
nothing to determine the content of that communication.”76) The trial judge then found 
that the relevant communications were not “to the public”. Here however the reasoning 
diverts interestingly from that in the US and Singaporean cases we’ve canvassed so far. 
Australian courts use the notion of the “copyright owner’s public” to distinguish between 
“public” and “private” performances. The “copyright owner’s public” is “the group 
which the copyright owner would . . . contemplate as its public for the performance of its 
work.”77 This approach originates in a line of UK cases which, in determining whether a 
performance was “in public,” focused on the harm the act causes to the author of the 
work.78 Thus, the essence of a performance “to the public” in Australian law is that it is 
occurring in circumstances where the owner is entitled to expect payment for the work’s 
authorized performance.79  
Applying this standard to the facts at issue, the trial judge found it relevant that “a user 
who made the recording for the protected purpose in s 111(1) and clicked the ‘play’ 
button to watch it would ordinarily be doing so for the very private and domestic use for 
which he or she made the recording,”80 and that users would have been perfectly entitled 
freely to copy the broadcasts via a VCR or DVR. For these reasons, he concluded that, 
“the impact of a user communicating the recording or film to his or her compatible device 
lacks the element of commercial detriment to the rightholders’ that is necessary for a 
transmission to be ‘to the public”.81    
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
72  Id. 
73  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
74  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Australia), 22(6). 
75  Id. at [90]. 
76  Id, at [95]. 
77  Telstra Corp. v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1997) 191 CLR 140, 199.  
78  Telstra Corp. v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1997) 191 CLR 140, 198-00 (citing Harms 
(Inc.) Ltd v Martans Club Ltd [1927] 1 Ch 526; Jennings v Stephens [1936] Ch 469; Ernest Turner 
Electrical Instruments Ltd v Performing Right Society Ltd [1943] Ch 167). 
79  See, e.g., Telstra Corp. v Australasian Performing Right Ass’n (1997) 191 CLR 140, 198-99. 
80  Id. 
81  Id.  The EU Commission found exactly the contrary, see discussion infra. 
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The trial judge found no infringement of the right to copy either. He held that the maker 
of the copies was the user, because “[i]f the user does not click ‘record’, no films will 
brought into existence.”82 His analysis noted that the finding was consistent with the 
reasoning of the Second Circuit in Cablevision.83  Having found that the users made the 
copies, the trial judge then found that they were protected by the statutory timeshifting 
exception.84 
 
The appeals court did not revisit the issues relating to the communication right, but did 
overturn the trial judge’s findings regarding the right to copy. The Full Federal Court 
ultimately held that Optus (possibly alone, but probably in conjunction with the user) was 
the maker of the recorded copies.  It described Optus’s role in making the copy, by 
capturing the broadcast and storing it on its servers, as being “so pervasive that, even 
though entirely automated, it cannot be disregarded when the ‘person’ who does the act 
of copying is to be identified.”85 It found that the recording is made only “by reason of 
Optus’ system remaining ‘up’ and available to implement the subscriber’s request at the 
time when its recording controllers poll the user database and receive a response 
indicating that a recording has been requested.”86 It rejected the Cablevision-style 
“volitional conduct” approach to the question of “who makes the copy,” finding that it 
would “require a gloss to be put on the word ‘make’ in the Act.”87 The court saw no 
reason why “a person who designs and operates a wholly automated copying system 
ought as of course not be treated as a ‘maker’ of an infringing copy where the system 
itself is configured designedly so as to respond to a third party command to make that 
copy”.88 Ultimately the court held that, even if a “volitional conduct” standard were 
adopted, it would be satisfied by Optus’ conduct in “creating and keeping in constant 
readiness the TV Now system.”89 In its view, Optus wasn’t “merely making available its 
system to another who uses it to copy a broadcast … Rather it captures, copies, stores and 
makes available for reward, a programme for later viewing by another.”90 As Optus was 
not protected by the timeshifting exception, it was directly liable for infringement of the 
reproduction right.91  
 
Are these the right questions? 
 
As in Singapore, the Australian timeshifting exception applies regardless of whether it is 
“fair” to make those copies. No TV license fee or other remuneration is paid in exchange. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
82  Singtel Optus, at [62]. 
83  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings 536 F 3d 121 at 138 (2008: CA 2), Singtel Optus v National Rugby 
League Investments (No 2) [2012] FCA 34, at [66]. 
84  Ibid, at [74]-[85]. 
85  Ibid, at [67]. 
86  Ibid. 
87  National Rugby League Investments v Singtel Optus [2012] FCAFC 59, at [63]. 
88  Id, at [64], citing Jane C Ginsburg, “Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II, Caselaw: 
Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?” (2008) Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 
No 08158, at 15-18. 
89  Id. 
90  Id, at [68] (internal citations omitted).  
91  Id, at [93]. 
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The appeals court seemed strongly of the view that Optus’ service, providing “near-live” 
access, was not in fact fair, which may have influenced it to find that Optus also “made” 
the copies. Once again, the winner takes all. The copies are infringing and not permitted 
if the maker is the service; but perfectly lawful if the maker is exclusively the user. 
Regardless of who is found to make the copy, there is no room in this framework to query 
whether the particular use ought to be permitted in the circumstances. 
 
The Australian law governing the communication right is much more nuanced than the 
law relating to copies. Who makes the communication matters much less in this analysis 
than in the others we’ve seen so far, because the focus is on the relationship between the 
copyrighted work and its recipient, not the transmitter and the recipient. By focusing on 
the harm to the copyright owner’s economic interests, this enquiry invites deliberation on 
a range of considerations relating to the whether the ultimate use should be permitted. It 
is less vulnerable to avoision than the other interpretations we have canvassed so far, 
because the size of the audience doesn’t matter. Even a transmission from one person to 
herself may be public in nature if we use the lens of the “copyright owner’s public”.92   
  
Japan 
 
The Japanese copyright owner enjoys exclusive rights (among others) to engage in public 
transmission of his work, to communicate it publicly and to make reproductions.93  These 
rights are subject to a number of purpose-based exceptions, including one which permits 
the reproduction of copyrighted works ‘for the purpose of her personal use, family use or 
other similar uses within a limited circle’.94 A private copying levy paid by consumers 
remunerates owners for many of these uses.95 Under Japanese copyright law, injunctive 
relief is reserved for instances of direct infringement; in other cases, damages are the only 
remedy.96 To lessen the impact of this rule, a legal principle known as the ‘Karaoke 
Doctrine’ has evolved; it expands the scope of primary infringement to enable a finding 
of direct infringement where there is sufficient nexus between the service provider and 
the infringement.97 The doctrine originated in a case brought against the owners of a 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
92  See Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New Controversies and 
Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision (forthcoming, 38 Columbia Journal of Law 
& the Arts (2015)), 35-36. 41. 
93  Chosakuken Hō [Japanese Copyright Act], Law No. 48 of 1970, arts. 23(1) and (2); 21. (English 
translation available at http://www.cric.or.jp/english/clj/cl2.html).  
94  Chosakuken Hō [Japanese Copyright Act], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 30(1). (English translation 
available at http://www.cric.or.jp/english/clj/cl2.html). 
95  See eg Branislav Hazucha, ‘Law, Market and the Role of Courts in Regulating New Technologies and 
Online Services’ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427821 p 31.   
96  Chosakuken Hō [Japanese Copyright Act], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 112(1). (English translation 
available at http://www.cric.or.jp/english/clj/cl2.html). See also discussion within Naoya Isoda, 
‘Copyright Infringement Liability of Placeshifting Services in the United States and Japan’ 7 Wash J. 
L. Tech. & Arts 149, 165 (2011); Takashi B. Yamamoto, ‘Legal Liability for Indirect Infringement of 
Copyright in Japan’ http://www.itlaw.jp/yearbook35.pdf at 1-4. 
97  Takashi B. Yamamoto, ‘Legal Liability for Indirect Infringement of Copyright in Japan’ 
http://www.itlaw.jp/yearbook35.pdf at 1. 
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karaoke club.98 Its customers used the machines in the club to sing copyrighted songs, 
and the Court held the club owners themselves directly liable for infringing the 
performance right on the grounds that they were so closely involved in their customers’ 
acts that ‘singing by the guests may be considered to be the same as singing by the 
petitioners themselves.’99 The Karaoke Doctrine is analogous to the US secondary 
liability doctrine of vicarious infringement in that liability depends on an ability to 
oversee or ‘manage’ the activity and a financial interest in that activity.100 However, 
because it results in primary rather than secondary liability, service providers can be 
liable for their customers’ exploitation of works even where those customers had a right 
to do so because of an exception within the Act.101   Since the Karaoke Doctrine is the 
only way by which injunctive relief may be obtained against those who facilitate conduct 
without personally committing infringing acts, courts may be inclined to read it 
expansively. 
 
A number of cases involving internet transmission of TV shows have made their way 
through Japanese courts in the last few years. The most relevant to our discussion of 
Aereo is Maneki TV.102 Sony’s ‘LocationFree’ equipment ‘slings’ TV signals to other 
locations; the ‘base station’ of the device receives broadcasts, digitizes them and 
automatically transmits them to users on demand.103 Users can then receive those 
transmissions on another device via the internet.104 Maneki TV’s business involved 
renting space to its customers for the storage of their ‘LocationFree’ base stations, and 
then connecting them to a broadcast signal and the internet.105 This service was 
particularly attractive to users wanting to watch Japanese TV while living abroad.  
Broadcasters argued that the service provider had itself made the transmissions in 
accordance with the karaoke doctrine, and thus was directly liable for infringement. The 
Intellectual Property High Court of Japan held there was no public transmission by the 
defendant because each base station simply transmitted to a single corresponding device, 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
98  ‘Club Cat’s Eye’ decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, 15 March 1988, 42 Minshu Number 3. The 
development of this doctrine is discussed in detail in Takashi B. Yamamoto, ‘Legal Liability for 
Indirect Infringement of Copyright in Japan’ http://www.itlaw.jp/yearbook35.pdf at 9-11.  
99  Takashi B. Yamamoto, ‘Legal Liability for Indirect Infringement of Copyright in Japan’ 
http://www.itlaw.jp/yearbook35.pdf at 10 citing ‘Club Cat’s Eye’ decision of the Japanese Supreme 
Court, 15 March 1988, 42 Minshu Number 3.   
100  Takashi B. Yamamoto, ‘Legal Liability for Indirect Infringement of Copyright in Japan’ 
http://www.itlaw.jp/yearbook35.pdf at 11. 
101  Naoya Isoda, ‘Copyright Infringement Liability of Placeshifting Services in the United States and 
Japan’ 7 Wash J. L. Tech. & Arts 149, 168 (2011); Takashi B. Yamamoto, ‘Legal Liability for 
Indirect Infringement of Copyright in Japan’ http://www.itlaw.jp/yearbook35.pdf at 1. 
102  Due to difficulties accessing comprehensive translations of the case, we have relied more on 
secondary sources than would usually be the case. 
103  Maneki TV decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p1 (from English translation by Haruaki Murao, 
on file with authors).  
104  Maneki TV decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p1-2 (from English translation by Haruaki 
Murao, on file with authors); Branislav Hazucha, ‘Law, Market and the Role of Courts in Regulating 
New Technologies and Online Services’ http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427821 
p 10.  
105  Maneki TV decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p2 (from English translation by Haruaki Murao, 
on file with authors). 
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not to the “public.”106 In 2011, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a public 
transmission can occur even if the device transmits only to a single other device, and that 
“[w]hen said device is connected with a telecommunications line that is provided for use 
by the public and information is continuously inputted therein, it is reasonable to consider 
that the actor of the transmission is the person inputting information to said device.”107 
Because any subscriber could use the service, the Court was satisfied that those 
subscribers were “the public.”108 
 
At around the same time the High Court was also asked to resolve the legality of a similar 
technology, the “Rokuraku II.” The Rokuraku system had similar functionality to that 
provided by Maneki TV, but allowed users to make copies as well as “sling” the 
signal.109 The plaintiff broadcasters alleged infringement of their exclusive right of 
reproduction. Emphasizing that it was the users themselves who chose and initiated the 
recordings, the High Court found that the service provider had not committed any 
infringement, but instead was doing “no more than provide an environment that 
facilitates the reproduction by a user of the Service.”110 The users themselves were not 
liable either, as their making of the copies was permitted under the personal use 
exception.  
 
The Supreme Court reversed in this case as well, finding that the service provider was in 
fact a maker of the copies, even though the subscriber was the only person involved in 
their selection and initiation: 
 
the Service Provider not only provides an environment that facilitates the 
reproduction, but also plays an [sic] pivotal role in realizing the reproduction of 
the Broadcast Programs using a Reproduction Device by receiving broadcasts and 
inputting information relating to the Broadcast Programs to the Reproduction 
Device under its management and control. As such, it is virtually impossible for 
the user of said service to reproduce the Broadcast Programs unless the Service 
Provider conducts each of the acts in reproduction, even if the user sends a 
request for recording. Thus, the Service Provider can be deemed to be the actor of 
reproduction.111 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
106  Maneki TV decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p2 (from English translation by Haruaki Murao, 
on file with authors). 
107  Maneki TV decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p3 (from English translation by Haruaki Murao, 
on file with authors). 
108  Maneki TV decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p3 (from English translation by Haruaki Murao, 
on file with authors). 
109  Rokuraku II decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p  2 (from English translation by Haruaki 
Murao, on file with authors). 
110  Rokuraku II decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p  2 (from English translation by Haruaki 
Murao, on file with authors). 
111  Maneki TV decision of the Japanese Supreme Court, p3 (from English translation by Haruaki Murao, 
on file with authors). Both cases were remanded to the High Court for further consideration, where it 
was ultimately found that Maneki TV was directly liable for infringing the rights of public 
performance and of making performances transmittable, See Cite Maneki TV (2012) Intellectual 
Property High Court. It was also held that that the provider of the Rokuraku II technology did make 
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Are these the right questions? 
 
For the same reasons as in Singapore and Australia, the legality of copies depends 
entirely on “who makes” them, with no room whatsoever for consideration of factors 
such as the nature of the use, or whether that use might harm the copyright owner’s 
markets. The application of the public performance right also largely turns on “who does 
the act?”, since the determination of the actor then affects the assessment of whether the 
audience is “the public”. The finding in Maneki that the service provider made the 
transmissions also meant that the transmissions were “to the public”, since any subscriber 
could use the service. On this logic, had the individual subscriber been held to have made 
the transmissions, their inaccessibility to third parties would have pointed toward a 
finding that the transmissions were not “to the public”.   
 
EU national law approaches to making available on an individualized basis   
 
France 
 
In May 2008 the Wizzgo company began offering a free internet-based service which 
allowed users to record and store programs offered by the national television stations that 
engage in digital broadcasting. The service involved two kinds of copies: temporary 
buffer copies, which Wizzgo claimed fell within the 2001 Information Society 
Directive’s transitory copying exception,112 and permanent copies, which Wizzgo argued 
fell within the scope of an exception for private copying (for which remuneration would 
have been paid via a private copying fee levied on the recording equipment and 
media).113 Like the laws of Singapore, Australia and Japan, French copyright law 
confines the private copying exception to copies made by (and not on behalf of) the 
beneficiary of the copy.114 Thus, the exception would apply only if the user, not the 
service, was the maker of the copies.   
 
The remote videorecorder service allowed the user to select programs from the Wizzgo 
program guide; selected programs would then be encrypted and stored on the Wizzgo 
server until the user requested them, at which point they would be sent to the user’s 
computer and decrypted.  In arguing that the user was the maker of the copies, Wizzgo 
stressed the automated nature of its service: the user’s initial click would initiate the 
automatic recording of the selected program, which would be stored on the Wizzgo 
platform until the user took the initiative to request it.  Wizzgo also contended that the 
buffer copies met the law’s criteria for non-infringing transitory copies, which requires 
them to be temporary and have no independent economic value.115   
 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
the relevant copies and thus infringe the reproduction right. See Cite Rokuraku II (2012) Intellectual 
Property High Court. 
112 Directive 2001/29 on Copyright in the Information Society, art. 5(1). 
113  France, Code of intellectual property, art. L. 122-5(2); L. 311-1 – L. 311-8. 
114  See France, Code of intellectual property, art. L 122-5(2). 
115  Id. art. L 122-5(6).  
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The owners of the copyrights in the television programs countered that Wizzgo’s 
encryption and decryption features made no difference to the nature of the service, whose 
purpose was to make retention, not transitory, copies on behalf of the users.  The Paris 
Court of Appeals116 agreed that the encryption features were irrelevant (finding that the 
service would perform the same functions without them), and that Wizzgo created a copy 
for the end user to keep for as long as he or she wished.  Those copies, moreover, had an 
economic value for the service because the service’s advertising revenues depended on 
the number of subscribers and the number of copies made on their behalf.  As a result, the 
service fulfilled the requirements of neither the transitory copying nor the private copying 
exceptions. 
 
Are these the right questions? 
 
The French court did not address whether the transmissions back to the end users were 
communications to the public; its determination that the Wizzgo service was built on 
illicit copies obviated any analysis of the legality of communications emanating from 
those copies.  Accordingly, this case gives us no guidance about whether the “wrong” 
questions are being asked in the context of transmissions. However, we may glean some 
clues from the statute. French law does not define “le public”, but does recognize an 
exception for free performances carried out in the intimacy of the “family circle”.117 The 
family circle exception may imply that paid performances, or even free ones outside that 
circle, might be “public”. If so, French law would offer courts more flexibility than 
conceptions that rely solely on the size of the audience.118 When it comes to copies 
however, the analysis is much more constrained, and, because of the wording of the 
private copying exception, once again results in liability depending almost entirely on 
who makes the copy.   
 
Germany 
 
In 2005, shift.tv began offering an internet-based personal videorecorder that enabled 
users to choose among free-to-air television and to request shift.tv to record specific 
shows for the users’ subsequent viewing on demand.  The RTL broadcast service initiated 
an action for violation of its neighboring rights to reproduce and make publicly available 
the broadcasts, as well as its separate right to retransmit those broadcasts.  Shift.tv offered 
a Cartoon Network-like defense: the users made the copies, and their subsequent 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
116 Wizzgo v. Metropole Television et autres, Paris Court of Appeals, decision of 14 December 2011, 
http://www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=3297 
117  CPI L 122-2 (“Les copies ou reproductions réalisées à partir d'une source licite et strictement 
réservées à l'usage privé du copiste et non destinées à une utilisation collective” ; « copies or 
reproductions made from a lawful source and strictly reserved to the private use of the copyist, and 
not intended for collective use »). 
118  French domestic law, however, must be read in light of the Court of Justice of the EU’s interpretation 
of the 2001 Information Society Directive’s art. 3(1) on communication to the public; according to 
CJEU caselaw, “it follows from Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 that, by the term ‘public’, that 
provision refers to an indeterminate number of potential recipients and implies, moreover, a fairly 
large number of persons (SGAE, paragraphs 37 and 38, and ITV Broadcasting and Others, paragraph 
32), ” Case C-466/12, Svensson v Retriever Sverige, 13 Feb. 2013, para 21. 
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transmission back to the users was not “to the public” because the transmission was 
communicated only to the requesting user, from her personal copy.  Germany also has an 
exception which permits individuals to make private copies, including of audio-visual 
material.119 Rightholders are remunerated for some of these uses via levies.120 
 
The German Supreme Court affirmed lower court findings that shift.tv had not infringed 
broadcasters’ rights to reproduce or make publicly available, but did hold that it had 
infringed the right of retransmission. 
 
On the reproduction right, the Court held that the user should be deemed the maker of the 
copies; the copies therefore would come within the German private copying exception.121  
The user “initiates through the programming of the recording a purely technical process 
which—as found in the hearing of the evidence—occurs in a  fully automated manner 
without external human intervention.”122   
 
With respect to the making available right, the Supreme Court held that there was no 
infringement because the defendant’s retransmission directly to the storage lockers of 
individual customers meant that the service did not make the broadcasts available to “the 
public”.123 The court’s reasoning suggested that the outcome may have been different had 
the defendant kept copies on a server and distributed them centrally from there.124   
 
However, the Court nonetheless found that shift.tv had violated the broadcaster’s 
retransmission right:  
 
42. The Defendant receives the transmission signals of the [television] broadcast 
with satellite antennas and transmits them simultaneously to online 
videorecorders, which are assigned to the sphere of the customers who are the 
makers of the fully automatic recordings.  Since the Defendant provides its 
customers with “personal videorecorder” receiving devices, the Defendant’s 
activity is within the meaning of an exploitation of a work comparable to other 
copyright-protected exploitations made through public replay. 
 
43. The Defendant has made available plaintiff’s [television] broadcast to a 
“plurality of members of the public.” The Court of Appeal has correctly assumed 
that even a few people are a “plurality” within the meaning of § 15(3) of the 
German Copyright Law.125 The plaintiff’s broadcasting signal could be 
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119  Copyright Act of 9/9/1965 (Germany) § 53. 
120  For the technologies (and applicable rates) as of 2013, see 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/1037/wipo_pub_1037_2013.pdf at 65-66. 
121  Shift.tv, BGH (German Supreme Court), I ZT 152/11, 11 April 2013. 
122   Id. para. 11.  Many thanks to David Ruther and Maximilian Vonthien, both Columbia Law School 
LLM Class of 2014, for translating the BGH decision. 
123  Id. para. 21-22. 
124  Id. para. 21. 
125  Art. 15(3) provides: 
 The communication of a work shall be deemed public if it is intended for a plurality of members 
of the public. Anyone who is not connected by a personal relationship with the person exploiting 
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independently and simultaneously recorded by [multiple] users of “Shift.TV” who 
are not connected to each other by personal relationships. The Court of Appeal 
rightly assumed that a plurality of members of the public received reproductions 
of plaintiff’s broadcast. The time at which the users in fact watch the recorded 
broadcast is irrelevant. 
 
In this analysis the Court focused on shift.tv’s transmission of the over-the-air television 
signal from its antennae to its subscribers’ virtual videorecorders (rather than the 
transmission from the recorder to the subscriber).  While the users would have “made” 
the copies by initiating the request that the signal be downloaded into the user’s remote 
storage box, the court deemed the relaying of the broadcast signal to the storage box for 
user download to be a secondary transmission.  Because the target audience was members 
of the public in general at the moment of the offer to deliver the signals, shift.tv was 
engaging in a secondary transmission to the public.  (By contrast, on the court’s earlier 
analysis, once the signals had been downloaded to the personal storage space, the 
resulting copies were not part of the “public sphere” and therefore did not give rise to a 
communication to the public when they were subsequently played back to the user.) Thus 
all the elements of a violation of the retransmission right fell into place.  
 
Are these the right questions? 
  
In the context of copies, legality or infringement once again depends almost entirely on 
who is found to have made the copy, and not on the underlying use to which the copy is 
put.   
 
With respect to the transmission of the performances, the German law operates quite 
differently from the others we have examined. As interpreted, it distinguishes between 
the service’s initial retransmission to the subscribers’ storage boxes (an infringement of 
the retransmission right) and the subscribers’ separate transmissions to themselves 
(falling outside all of the copyright owners’ exclusive rights).  
 
The ruling that the second stage of communication was not to the public because the one-
on-one transmission did not encompass a “plurality of persons” was not dispositive of 
liability because the entity engaging in the first stage communication was retransmitting 
to multiple persons.  The “who makes?” question in this context thus attracts more than 
one answer.  
 
Unfortunately, dividing the acts into some attributable to the service and others 
attributable to the end user does not eliminate the possibility for avoision. As a result, 
multiplying the number of potential actors and asking which one commits a copyright-
infringing act may also be a “wrong” question. Consider how the law so construed would 
apply to a system like Japan’s Maneki TV or Rokuraku. If each subscriber provided her 
own receiving equipment, as occurred in those cases, there would be no transmission 
from the operator’s receiver to “the public”, and thus precisely the same end result could 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
the work or with the other persons to whom the work is made perceivable or made available in 
non-material form shall be deemed to be a member of the public. 
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be achieved in a way that is copyright free. A system like Aereo’s individual antennae 
may successfully eliminate the operator’s part in the transmission as well. On this 
reasoning, technical architecture would continue to determine liability.    
 
EU authorities 
At the end of 2007, the Italian legislature modified the copyright law’s compulsory 
license regime for private copying to add “remote videorecorder” services.126  The EU 
Commission, Internal Market and Services Directorate General, demanded that Italy 
rescind the measure.127  The Commission’s letter condemned the Italian law as a violation 
of the reproduction and making available rights in the 2001 EU Information Society 
Directive.  The Commission rejected Italy’s characterization of the service as merely 
enabling its customers to make private copies.  The Commission also stated that no other 
permissible copyright exception could shelter Italy’s “weakening” of the reproduction 
and making available rights because “the offer of video on demand services is an 
important part of the revenue stream of the rightholders” and remote time-shifting 
services “are in direct competition” with copyright owners’ exclusive rights to license 
video on demand. “It is difficult to conceive how an exception for remote videorecording 
services could not in the last analysis conflict with and reduce the opportunities for 
commercial exploitation of licensed on demand services.”128  As a result of the 
Commission’s rebuke,129 the government never implemented the amendment, and an 
Italian administrative court rejected a service provider’s attempt to compel 
implementation, observing that the characterization of the remote videorecorder service 
as engaging in a “making available” of content to end users was consistent with a textual 
analysis of the Directive.130 
 
Another personalized transmission service fell afoul of EU norms when the Court of 
Justice for the European Union ruled that TV Catchup, a service that offered streaming of 
over the air broadcasts to U.K. users whose households possessed a television-viewing 
license was engaging in unlawful communications to the public.131  TV Catchup captured 
broadcast signals through an aerial and sent the signals to servers, which extracted 
individual video streams from the received signals.  Upon the user’s request, the streams 
then were sent to another server which created a separate stream for each user who 
requested a channel through it. An individual packet of data leaving the server was thus 
addressed to an individual user, not to a class of users.132 Unlike Aereo, TV Catchup did 
not assign each subscriber to a separate antenna, but it did divide the source transmission 
into separate streams corresponding to each subscriber.  Pursued by British broadcasters, 
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126  See Decreto-Legge of Dec. 31, 2007, n. 248. Art. 5(2-ter), converted 28 February 2008 to law n. 31 of 
31 December 2007. 
127  Letter n. 29900 DG Markt/D1/DB/D (2009). 
128  Letter n. 29900, supra at 4-5 (translation Ginsburg). 
129  The letter also warned that Italy’s failure to modify the law could lead the Commission to initiate an 
action against Italy for non-compliance with its obligations under the EU Treaty, id. p. 5. 
130  Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale, Lazio Roma, sez. II, 02.3.2012, n. 2157, pp. 41-44. 
131  Case C-607/11 TVCatchup Ltd, 7 March 2013. 
132  (CJEU opinion, paras 13-14).   
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TV Catchup urged that its service was not communicating the television programming to 
the public, because each subscriber was receiving individualized transmissions.  The 
CJEU rejected the defense:  
 
31 In . . . order to be categorised as a ‘communication to the public’ within the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, the protected works must also in 
fact be communicated to a ‘public’. 
32  In that connection, it follows from the case-law of the Court that the term 
‘public’ in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 refers to an indeterminate number of 
potential recipients and implies, moreover, a fairly large number of persons . . .  . 
33  As regards that last criterion specifically, the cumulative effect of making 
the works available to potential recipients should be taken into account. In that 
connection, it is in particular relevant to ascertain the number of persons who 
have access to the same work at the same time and successively . . .  .  
34    In that context, it is irrelevant whether the potential recipients access the 
communicated works through a one-to-one connection. That technique does not 
prevent a large number of persons having access to the same work at the same 
time. 
. . . 
 
Are these the right questions? 
 
Although the TV Catchup decision concerned live streaming rather than the capture-and-
transmit model of Aereo, it nonetheless provides useful guidance as to the meaning of 
“the public” under EU law. The CJEU’s holding that the “public” means “an 
indeterminate number of potential recipients and implies … a fairly large number of 
persons” confirmed earlier judgments to the same effect.133   Unfortunately however, that 
definition seems vulnerable to the same kind of exploitability as the Supreme Court’s in 
Aereo. By focusing on the number of potential recipients, rather than on the nature of the 
relationship between the recipient and the work, this distinction also fails to provide a 
principled mechanism for distinguishing between public and non-public performances.  
 
By contrast, the EU Commission, DG Markt (as it then was) in its admonition to Italy, 
largely eschewed technical analyses of “who does?” and concentrated on the economic 
impact of the law legitimating RS-DVRs.  In concluding that remote time-shifting 
services compete with copyright owners in the emerging market “for commercial 
exploitation of licensed on demand services,” the Commission, we believe, was focusing 
on the right questions. However, if providers do not reasonably make content available 
for licence “on demand”, ruling out such systems altogether may leave consumers with 
no legitimate access options. If the rationale for finding remote DVRs to infringe the 
communication to the public right is to prevent competition with commercial exploitation 
of licensed VOD services, that rationale becomes less compelling in the absence of a 
reasonable prospect that the copyright owner will offer those services.     
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
133  See eg Case C-306/05 SGAE [2006] ECR I-11519, paragraphs 37-38, Case C-89/04 Mediakabel 
[2005] ECR I-4891, paragraph 30, and Case C-192/04 Lagardère Active Broadcast [2005] ECR I-
7199, paragraph 31. 
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Part 4: Lessons from Aereo and its international brethren: what might the “right” 
questions look like? 
The above ramble through various world jurisdictions is by no means exhaustive, but 
nonetheless discloses some striking patterns. In most jurisdictions, claims invoking the 
reproduction right succeed or fail depending almost entirely on who is found to have 
made the copy. If it is the user, then as long as any threshold elements are satisfied (such 
as being made “solely for private and domestic use”134) the copy will be permitted; if it is 
the service provider, then every copy will be infringing. This leads to all-or-nothing 
outcomes: if the service is found to do the deliberate act of the subscriber, the user’s 
rights to make private copies – including those granted by statute for targeted purposes, 
and paid for by levies - can disappear. If the user is found to do the act, there is no room 
to consider whether that particular act was an appropriate act in light of all circumstances 
including the service provider’s contribution, and the amount paid for the use (if any).  
 
In this context of copies, the only one of these jurisdictions to permit a more nuanced 
analysis of whether the use ought to be allowed is the US. There, “who did the act?” is 
only the first part of the analysis; there may also be a defence based on fair use. That 
defense requires courts take into account all statutorily enumerated factors (including the 
nature and purpose of the use and its effect upon the potential market for the work135) in 
order to determine whether the use is “fair” (and therefore permitted without 
remuneration). This framework provides some scope for considering the social benefits 
and economic impact of the ultimate use. However, because of the different assessment 
of the fairness of the use depending on whether the “doer” is found to be the service 
provider or the end-user, a great deal still hangs on the answer to “who makes”. The 
Supreme Court’s finding that Aereo engaged in the performances, for example, meant 
that the exception was so far from applying that no fair use analysis even occurred.  
 
DG Markt’s approach, if integrated into the infringement analysis, would result in airing 
some of the same issues as under a US fair use analysis, given the Commission’s focus 
on whether the “timeshifted” copies would compete with licensed VOD exploitations. 
Moreover, the DG Markt approach seems less vulnerable to manipulation of the person 
who “does” the copyright infringing act, than the Supreme Court’s, because it focuses 
squarely on the use itself.   
 
The analysis of the right of public performance produced greater divergence between our 
illustrative jurisdictions. In a number of cases, the answer to “who does the act?” again 
dictated liability. Like the US, jurisdictions such as the EU and Singapore also focus on 
the size of the audience in determining whether a communication is “public”. That means 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
134  The various threshold requirements in each state must also be satisfied, eg in Australia the copy must 
be for “solely for private and domestic use by watching or listening to the material broadcast at a time 
more convenient than the time when the broadcast is made”; Singapore requires them to be made for 
“private and domestic use”, and in Japan “for the purpose of her personal use, family use or other 
similar uses within a limited circle”. See discussion above. 
135  17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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that, if the communicator is the user, and she is transmitting only to herself, it cannot 
possibly be “public” – no matter how much such transmissions cumulatively interfere 
with licensed markets. 
 
In Australia however, we saw an interesting approach which focused on the relationship 
between the copyrighted work and the recipient of the transmission, rather than the 
transmitter and the recipient. This focus made the question of “who performs?” much less 
significant, and opened room for more principled considerations of whether the ultimate 
use should be treated as a “public” one (and therefore within the scope of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights), depending on the use’s interference with the market for the 
work rather than on who engaged in the transmission.  The Australian approach also 
meant that a transmission from one person to herself could, in appropriate circumstances, 
be “public” in nature. 
 
Our exploratory analysis also highlighted the continuing significance of the distinction 
between primary and secondary infringement – as well as the circumstances in which 
relying on principles of secondary liability would be insufficient. As described above, 
Japan and Australia both take expansive approaches to the question of “who does the 
act”. Consequently, service providers in those jurisdictions are more likely to face direct 
(as opposed to secondary) liability. The Australian Full Federal Court’s reasoning has 
potential implications far beyond the context of remote DVRs. Although the Full Court 
acknowledged “that different relationships and differing technologies may well yield 
different conclusions to the ‘who makes the copy’ question”,136 technology providers and 
some legal commentators alike view the uncertainty stemming from the breadth of its 
reasoning as seriously disincentivizing investment in cloud computing services.137 The 
Law Council of Australia expressed concern that, despite the Court’s limiting language, 
“[t]he conclusion that Optus was the maker of the copies in question … seems equally 
applicable to other online storage systems such as Dropbox, Sugarsync, Flickr, Google 
Drive, YouTube and so on.”138  Cloud storage and remote backup providers could face 
broad direct liability under this reasoning because they design and operate wholly 
automated copying systems that are configured to make copies in response to requests 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
136  National Rugby League Investments v Singtel Optus [2012] FCAFC 59, at [100]. 
137  See e.g. Rebecca Giblin, Stranded in the Technological Dark Ages: Implications of the Full Federal 
Court’s Decision in NRL v Optus 35 European Intellectual Property Review 632 (2012). Responding 
to a recent inquiry into Australia’s copyright exceptions, eBay described the Optus decision 
as“creat[ing] serious disincentives for the development of cloud services in Australia” 
(http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/93._org_ebay.pdf, at 9); the Internet Industry 
Association described the standard as unacceptably uncertain and as ‘creat[ing] a barrier to the 
adoption of cloud technology.’ 
(http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/253._org_internetindustryassociation.pdf at 5-6); 
Google finds that it ‘rendered the status of a wide range of … applications and services highly 
uncertain’, and ‘impose[d] barriers to the introduction of remote storage services including cloud 
computing and network PVRs’. (http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/217._org_google.pdf 
at p35.)    
138  http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/263._org_lawcouncilaustralia.pdf at 7. 
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from third parties. This is precisely the kind of activity the Full Federal Court in Optus 
held should result in direct liability, albeit, it bears emphasis, in circumstances where the 
service provider was itself proposing the content.  
The most useful and intuitive of these systems make copies without any specific direction 
from the user, potentially making such providers more intimately involved with their 
users’ copies than was Optus. Consider Dropbox, for example. The actual user has only 
to install the application, login, and start putting material in her Dropbox folder. Then she 
can sit back while the Dropbox service handles everything else: actively monitoring that 
folder, automatically copying and synchronizing new and changed files to each device 
over the internet, and encrypting those files when they reach Dropbox’s servers.139  Who 
makes those copies? While the Dropbox scenario concerns content the user herself 
posted, rather than content initially supplied by the storage service (as was the case in 
Optus), Australian-based service providers have expressed concern that Optus’ 
characterization of “who makes”  might mean that they could deemed the “makers.”  
Accordingly, they highlight this risk as a key barrier to investment in cloud 
technologies.140 (The asserted risk both uproots Optus from its facts, and may overstate 
the extent to which Optus in fact affects decisions about cloud-based investments; other 
considerations, such as the absence of flexible exceptions that would permit user copying 
in some circumstances, and the lack of any Australian safe harbour protecting Dropbox-
style providers may also play a role in the current paucity of such services in Australia.) 
In Japan, technology providers have also argued that the broad interpretation of “maker” 
is a serious barrier to investment in (and adoption of) cloud-based technologies.141 Setting 
aside the possibility that some of these statements may be self-serving, it is clear that a 
too-ready finding that the service provider itself engaged in the act can undesirably blur 
the line between primary and secondary infringement. 
On the other hand, however, it is problematic to rely on secondary infringement 
principles to obtain redress in situations where the law that governs primary infringement 
is unsatisfactory. For example, a copying exception that applies to all uses, regardless of 
their nature and impact, will extend to some that ought not to be permitted. Similarly, a 
conception of “the public” that relies on transmissions being directed to a “large” number 
of people will fail to fully capture all of the circumstances in which a transmission might 
be public in nature. Where principled mechanisms for making determinations about 
primary infringement are missing, principles of secondary liability cannot fill the gap.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
139  https://www.dropbox.com/help/4/en. 
140  Supra, note 139. 
141 See, e.g.,  A World Without Cablevision nor Sony: How Japanese Courts Find Providers of Personal 
Locker and Content-Sharing Services Liable, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2238359, from section entitled ‘Effect of legal 
Environment on Cloud Businesses in Japan and the U.S.’ (pp28-33). 
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Part 4.  What are the “right” questions?    
 
If we are correct that copyright law in many cases asks the “wrong questions”, what then 
are the right ones? 
Given the significant (and increasing) potential for arbitrary outcomes to the “who does?” 
analysis, we consider that a better approach would centre inquiry on whether, after full 
reflection on the contributions of each party, the use should be permitted – instead of 
allowing ancillary considerations to determine liability. 
 
In the context of the reproduction right, the US law is very close to having such a 
framework already. In practice however, at least in the context of the kinds of technology 
this paper addresses, there are two barriers. First, as discussed above, fair use 
considerations can apply very differently depending on who is found to “make” the copy.  
Second, the application of those principles has been problematic. In 1984, the US 
Supreme Court held that it was a “fair use” for consumers to use Sony’s Betamax VCR to 
timeshift free broadcast television programming. Subsequently, many commentators and 
some courts have treated Sony as imprimatur for any timeshifting whatsoever.142 
However, Sony was far from a blanket authorization of any and all consumer time-
deferred copying of television broadcasts.  While the Sony court assumed that consumers 
should be entitled to watch at their convenience programming that they had been invited 
to view for free,143 the court reached the conclusion that the copies made there were not 
infringing only after deliberating considerations relating to market harm, cost and 
difficulty of copying, and the nonexistence of copyright owner-supplied alternatives to 
inconvenient broadcast times.144  
 
Technologies such as Aereo are readily distinguishable from the Betamax. Most 
importantly, they have much more potential to compete with remunerated markets for 
making the same content conveniently available on demand (which have developed 
significantly since the 1980s, now offering multiple alternative viewing opportunities to 
the original broadcast time). Moreover, the technologies themselves have eliminated a 
great deal of “friction” from the copying process (notably, as in the case of DISH’s 
“autohop” service, by automatically deleting the advertisements). However, there still 
seems to be a widely held view that “time shifting” = “fair use” regardless of such 
distinctions.145 This cannot be correct. Such shortcuts remove the nuance from the fair 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
142  See eg Fox Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F.Supp.2d 1088 (affirmed by Fox 
Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C. 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (also note opinion amended 
and en banc rejection by Fox Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 
260572, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 765 (9th Cir.(Cal.) Jan 24, 2014) (NO. 12-57048)). 
143  464 U.S. at 421, 423-25 and n. 8. 
144  See Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk About Aereo: Copyright-Avoiding Business 
Models, Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of the “Transmit” Clause, Colum. L. & Economics 
Working Paper No. 480 (2014), 35.  
145  See eg Fox Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F.Supp.2d 1088 (affirmed by Fox 
Broad . Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C. 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (also note opinion amended 
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use framework, and render the analysis as binary as those in other jurisdictions we 
canvassed above. Asking “are the copies made for purposes of time-shifting?” is a 
“wrong” question, at least where an answer of “yes” equates those purposes with “non-
infringing”. The use-based focus we advocate is achievable within the existing 
framework if, instead of taking such mental shortcuts, all fair use analyses were 
conducted with due consideration of all relevant circumstances, including awareness of 
how technologies and markets have changed since Sony, and the contributions made by 
provider and user.   
 
In the context of the public performance right, the US framework may be missing some 
analytic steps before it can focus on the desirability of the ultimate use. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court in Aereo did open the door to future judicial consideration of the “right” 
questions by stating that whether or not recipients constitute “the public” often depends 
on their relationship to the underlying work.146  The court’s adverting to a “possessory” 
relationship between the user and the work explicitly recognizes that the use of the work 
is significant in determining whether there is any infringing public performance at all. As 
we have argued elsewhere, such considerations could be integrated into the US law’s 
public performance analysis by focusing more on the transmission’s economic impact on 
the copyright owner (whether via an Australian-style interpretation of “the public” or 
otherwise).147   
 
Conclusions 
We have argued that asking the “wrong” questions leaves the law vulnerable to avoision. 
As the law now stands – in the US as well as in a number of other jurisdictions – the 
focus on the “wrong” questions is sending copyright business models in the direction of 
tax planning, wastefully devoting resources to hyper-technical compliance with the letter 
rather than the meaning and purpose of the law.148 
Liability should not turn on ancillary questions such as who did the act, whether unique 
copies were made, or the size of a transmission’s potential audience, because these bases 
for (or against) liability can be vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation. Instead, the 
focus should train on the use itself. Does the use duplicate or displace existing forms of 
exploitation, supplanting markets, or creating new ones?  Aereo looks a lot like a cable 
retransmitter of broadcast signals – a use clearly encompassed within the scope of 
copyright’s exclusive rights. But Aereo is also providing users with an antenna (and a lot 
of computing resources) through which consumers may access broadcast TV, something 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
and en banc rejection by Fox Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 
260572, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 765 (9th Cir.(Cal.) Jan 24, 2014) (NO. 12-57048)). 
146  Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, at 2510 (2014).  
147  Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New Controversies and 
Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision (forthcoming, 38 Columbia Journal of Law 
& the Arts (2015)). 
148  See Susy Frankel, “The International Copyright Problem and Durable Solutions,” 15 Vanderbilt J. 
Ent. And Tech. L. (forthcoming 2015).  
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which they would be perfectly entitled to do with their own equipment from their own 
rooftops.  But recourse to established forms of exploitation within the scope of exclusive 
rights (cable), or to established non-infringing activities (rooftop antenna) may reduce to 
a battle of analogies.  The search for the “killer metaphor” obscures consideration of the 
“right” questions, such as whether, why and how remote antennae are different from 
rooftop ones.  Asking the “right” questions should lead to principled conclusions about 
the legal effects (if any) that should flow from distinctions between technological modes 
of exploitation.  
